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I. INTRODUCTION
The failure-to-warn claim is among the most common allega-
tions in products liability litigation.' The premise of the claim is
t Hildy Bowbeer is Senior Counsel in the Office of General Counsel, with
3M Company in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Wendy Lumish is a shareholder and Jeffrey Cohen is an associate with
Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A., in Miami, Florida. The
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that a manufacturer or seller failed to warn a consumer about an
unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm associated with the use of a
product. Such claims may be brought independently or, as is more
frequent, in connection with manufacturing and design defect
2claims. This article analyzes the key elements of the failure-to-warn
claim and addresses emerging or prevalent issues concerning this
claim. The article also points out numerous roadblocks that can
bar a plaintiffs failure-to-warn claim.
The frequency of failure-to-warn claims and their success has
been attributed to a number of factors. First, the failure-to-warn
claim is not highly technical in the same sense as a design or manu-
facturing defect claim.' In that regard, the failure-to-warn claim is
neither unduly confusing to a lay jury nor expensive to develop.4
Second, the intuitive notion stating that practically any product ca-
pable of causing serious harm can be made less dangerous by pro-
viding additional or different (i.e. "better") warnings or instruc-
tions is appealing to judges and juries alike.5 Third, it can be
difficult for a manufacturer to persuasively dispute the feasibility of• 6
providing additional or better warnings. Fourth, in many jurisdic-
tions, the plaintiffs burden to show that additional or better warn-
ings would have prevented the injury is comparatively slight! Fi-
nally, the costs of providing warnings relative to the costs of the
harm they may prevent are almost universally, if somewhat incor-
rectly, perceived as being low."
authors wish to thank Christopher McKay for his assistance with this endeavor.
1. Douglas R. Richmond, Renewed Look at the Duty to Warn and Affirmative De-
fenses, 61 DEF. COUNS. J. 205, 205 (1994); see also EdwardJ. Higgins, Gone But Not
Forgotten: Manufacturers' Post-Sale Duties to Warn or Recall, 78 MICH. B. J. 570, 570
(1999).
2. Richmond, supra note 1, at 205; see also Higgins, supra note 1, at 570.
3. Richmond, supra note 1, at 205; see also Higgins, supra note 1, at 570.
4. Higgins, supra note 1, at 570.
5. Richmond, supra note 1, at 205. See alsoJames A. Henderson & Aaron D.
Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65
N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 269-70 (1990) (stating that "the common assumption is that
warnings can often be improved upon but never be made worse.. .the issue at stake
is always whether the defendant ought to have supplied consumers with more, and
by definition better, information about product risks").
6. Higgins, supra note 1, at 570.
7. Id.
8. E.g., Anderson v. Hedstrom Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 422, 440 (S.D. N.Y.
1999) (holding that "[slince the cost of providing warnings is often minimal, the
balance usually weighs in favor of an obligation to warn" (quoting Cooley v.
Carter-Wallace, Inc., 478 N.Y.S.2d 375, 376-77 (4th Dist. 1984)); Ross Lab. v. Thies,
725 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Alaska 1986) (stating that "[t]he cost of giving an adequate
[Vol. 27:1
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Despite the apparent advantages plaintiffs possess in prosecut-
ing a failure-to-warn case, there nevertheless remain potent argu-
ments in a defense counsel's arsenal to defeat such claims. By
attacking the existence of a duty to warn or a breach thereof, and
attacking the grounds supporting causation, manufacturers and
sellers can successfully defend against the failure-to-warn claim.
II. THE FOUNDATION OF FAILURE-To-WARN STRICT LIABILITY VS.
NEGLIGENCE
Failure-to-warn claims against the manufacturer or seller of a
product manifest themselves under both strict liability and negli-
gence theories. Under strict liability, "an otherwise safe product
may be defective solely by virtue of an inadequate warning.' Un-
der negligence theory, by contrast, it is the behavior of the manu-
facturer or seller in failing to adequately warn, not the condition of
the product, that is at issue.10 The Supreme Court of California has
offered the following distinction between the theories:
[F]ailure to warn in strict liability differs markedly from
failure to warn in the negligence context. Negligence law
in a failure-to-warn case requires a plaintiff to prove that a
manufacturer or distributor did not warn of a particular
risk for reasons which fell below the acceptable standard
of care, i.e., what a reasonably prudent manufacturer
would have known and warned about. Strict liability is not
concerned with the standard of due care or the reason-
ableness of a manufacturer's conduct. The rules of strict
liability require a plaintiff to prove only that the defen-
dant did not adequately warn of a particular risk that was
known or knowable in the light of the generally recog-
nized and prevailing best scientific and medical knowl-
edge available at the time of manufacture and distribu-
tion. Thus, in strict liability, as opposed to negligence, the
reasonableness of the defendant's failure to warn is imma-
terial."
warning is usually so minimal, i.e., the expense of adding more printing to a label,
that the balance must always be struck in favor of the obligation to warn").
9. Ferayorni v. Hyundai Motor Co., 711 So. 2d 1167, 1170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998) (quoting Giddons v. Denman Rubber Mfg. Co., 440 So. 2d 1320, 1323 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
10. Olson v. Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Iowa 1994).
11. Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 558-59 (Cal.
1991).
20001
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As such, under strict liability failure-to-warn, a manufacturer or
seller "can be found liable even though he was utterly non-
negligent." Other courts have followed this reasoning.
3
Much has been written, by both courts
14 and commentators,15
about whether there is any meaningful difference between the
strict liability failure-to-warn and negligent failure-to-warn causes of
action. While a detailed analysis of the competing viewpoints is be-
yond the scope of this article, a few examples demonstrate that
such a distinction is highly questionable at best.
First, consider the oft-cited language from the California Su-
preme Court above." Whether a manufacturer or seller adequately
warned is a question of reasonableness, a concept rooted in the law
of negligence, as is what information the manufacturer or seller
knew or should have known about the dangerous propensities of
the product at the time of manufacture. 7 That is, the manufac-
turer or seller reasonably adequately warned or it did not; it rea-
sonably knew or should have known of risks related to the use of
the product or it did not.' As the Supreme Court of Iowa has ex-
plained:
12. Moorman v. Am. Safety Equip., 594 So. 2d 795, 800 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
13. Infra note 14; see also Fibreboard Corp. v. Fenton, 845 P.2d 1168, 1174-75
(Colo. 1993) (stating that a manufacturer can be found liable even though not
negligent).
14. Compare Olson v. Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Iowa 1994) (holding
that "any posited distinction between strict liability and negligence principles [in
failure-to-warn] is illusory"), Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922,
926 n.4 (Minn. 1986) (stating that "this court has adopted the position that strict
liability for failure-to-warn is based upon principles of negligence"), and Crislip v.
TCH Liquidating Co., 556 N.E.2d 1177, 1183 (Ohio 1990)(stating that "[t]he
standard imposed upon the defendant in strict liability claim grounded upon an
inadequate warning is the same as that imposed in a negligence claim based upon
inadequate warning"), with Anderson, 810 P.2d at 558 (stating that a manufacturer
"can be found liable even though he was utterly non-negligent"), and Ferayorni,
711 So. 2d at 1172 (holding that "a prima facie case of strict liability failure-to-warn
does not require a showing of negligence").
15. Compare Henderson & Twerski, supra note 5, at 269-70 (finding that negli-
gence is the appropriate standard in failure-to-warn cases), and Myron J. Brom-
berg, The Mischief of The Strict Liability Label in the Law of Warnings, 17 SETON HALL
L. REv. 526, 528 (1987) (same), with Mark McLaughlin Hager, Don't Say I Didn't
Warn You (Even Though I Didn't): Why The Pro-Defendant Consensus on Warning Law Is
Wrong, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1125, 1130-34 (1994) (finding that strict liability failure-to-
warn does not require a showing of negligence and is a distinct cause of action).
16. Anderson, 810 P.2d at 558-59.
17. Id.
18. Id.
[Vol. 27:1
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[C]ourts basing the application of a strict liability the-
ory... [in failure to warn cases] cannot help but slip back
into the type of analyses virtually identical to those em-
ployed in negligence cases.. .Inevitably the conduct of the
defendant in a failure to warn case becomes the is-
sue.. .The relevant inquiry therefore is whether the rea-
sonable manufacturer knew or should have known of the
danger, in light of the generally recognized and prevailing
best scientific knowledge, yet failed to provide adequate
warning to users or consumers.19
Thus, says the Iowa high court, even under strict liability, a
manufacturer or seller is ultimately gauged by a reasonableness
standard.2 °
Second, even commentators who advocate a strict liability fail-
ure-to-warn claim have difficulty articulating a significant distinc-
tion between strict liability and negligent failure-to-warn. For ex-
ample, one commentator boils down his argument in such a way as
to destroy it. He states that "the ultimate issue in warnings law" is
"[w] hat safety information did the user NEED and HOW WELL did the
supplier do in providing it? '21 Clearly, what the user "needed" to
know and "how well" the supplier provided that information is gov-
erned by a reasonableness standard: the consumer reasonably
needed to be warned or she did not; the manufacturer or seller did
a reasonable job in providing a warning or it did not. It is impossi-
ble to divorce the reasonableness aspect from the determination,
short of imposing absolute liability on manufacturers and sellers.
As such, the reasonableness of the defendant's failure-to-warn is al-
ways material, whether the action is tagged as one in negligence or
strict liability. 22
Based on the position of the majority of commentators, as
well as that of Section 2(c) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod-
19. Olson, 522 N.W.2d at 289-90.
20. Id.
21. Hager, supra note 15, at 1157 (emphasis added).
22. E.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra note 5, at 276; Bromberg, supra note 15,
at 529-30; John Howie & Ladd Sanger, Failure to Warn: The Difference Between Strict
Liability and Negligence From a Plaintiff's Perspective, 13 AIR & SPACE LAW. 3, 3 (Winter
1999) (stating that "strict liability failure-to-warn is nothing more than a negligence
test with a different label."); George W. Soule & Jacqueline M. Moen, Failure to
Warn in Minnesota, The New Restatement on Products Liability, and the Application of the
Reasonable Care Standard, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 389, 389 (1995) (noting that
"[t]he Minnesota courts have subscribed to [the reasonable care] theory for
years...").
2000]
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ucts Liability,2 it is apparent that the strict liability approach to
warnings law has been, or is in the process of being, supplanted
with the negligence-based reasonableness standard as to whether a
manufacturer failed to warn. Accordingly, this article adopts that
view. In any event, those jurisdictions which cling to strict liability
as a distinct cause of action, of course, also permit actions for neg-
24ligent failure-to-warn, and, as demonstrated, there are similar (if
not functionally identical) elements in each claim.
III. THE ELEMENTS OF A FAILURE-TO-WARN CLAIM
If a failure-to-warn claim is, at root, a negligence claim, then it
is clear a plaintiff must prove the traditional negligence elements to
succeed on such a claim: that the manufacturer or seller owed a
duty to warn of some danger associated with the foreseeable use of
the product; the manufacturer or seller breached that duty; and
25
the breach was the proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries. If the
plaintiff is unable to establish the existence of any of these three
26
elements, the claim must fail.
A. The Duty To Warn: Basic Principles
The duty to warn is predicated upon the superior knowledge
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c) (1998):
§ 2. Categories of Product Defect
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains
a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of
inadequate instructions or warnings. A product:
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced
or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the
seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of
distribution, and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the
product not reasonably safe.
Id.
24. E.g., Butz v. Werner, 438 N.W.2d 509, 513 (N.D. 1989) (holding that the
plaintiff does not have to elect between negligent failure-to-warn or strict products
liability theory); Crislip v. TCH Liquidating Co., 556 N.E.2d 1177, 1183 (Ohio
1990) (stating that elevation of form over substance in pleading "failure-to-warn"
claims would lead to inequitable results).
25. E.g., Maneely v. Gen. Motors Corp., 108 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir.
1997) (California law); Sharpe v. Bestop, Inc., 713 A.2d 1079, 1083-84 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1998).
26. This article does not discuss affirmative defenses to the failure-to-warn
claim as such. For an extended analysis of defenses available in failure-to-warn, see
Richmond, supra note 1, at 209.
[Vol. 27:1
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of a product that the manufacturer or seller possesses, and arises
when the manufacturer or seller may reasonably foresee danger of
injury or damage to another less knowledgeable, unless they are
warned of the danger.27 Courts generally recognize that this "duty
to warn" is determined by courts in the same manner as "duty" in
the ordinary negligence context. For example, the New York Court
of Appeals has noted that "the definition of the existence and
scope of an alleged tortfeasor's duty is usually a legal, policy-laden
declaration reserved for Judges .... "2 8  Likewise, Prosser and
Keeton explain that "[i]t is no part of the province of ajury to de-
cide whether a manufacturer of goods is under any obligation for
the safety of the ultimate consumer."29 As such, "it is wrong for a
judge to decide to permit a fact-finding jury to decide a question of
duty. 30
There are two elements to the duty: the duty to warn of fore-
seeable dangers inherent in the use of the 3roduct, and the duty to
provide adequate instructions for safe use. However, manufactur-
ers and sellers need not provide a warning when the danger or po-
32tentiality of danger is generally known and recognized. Further, a
manufacturer is not required to warn of every risk that is suggested
27. Lovick v. Wil-Rich, 588 N.W.2d 688, 693 (Iowa 1999).
28. Palka v. Servicemaster Mgmt. Servs. Corp., 634 N.E.2d 189, 192 (N.Y.
1994); accord Josue v. Isuzu Motors Am., Inc., 958 P.2d 535, 537 (Haw.
1998) (stating that "the existence of duty to warn is entirely a question of law for
the Court to decide"); Balder v. Haley, 399 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. 1987) (stating
that "the existence of a duty to warn is a legal question to be determined by the
judge, not the jury"). But see Liriano v. Horbart Corp., 170 F.3d 264, 271 (2d Cir.
1999) (holding that "a jury could, and indeed did, find that Hobart had a duty to
provide" a warning).
29. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at
358 (5th ed. 1984).
30. Hildy Bowbeer & David S. Killoran, Liriano v. Hobart Corp.: Obvious Dan-
gers, the Duty to Warn of Safer Alternatives, and the Heeding Presumption, 65 BROOK. L.
REv. 717, 726 (1999). This rule is necessary because "[a] jury is charged to hear
and weigh the evidence, but it hears nothing of the policy considerations involved
in a question of duty and is therefore ill-equipped to decide whether a duty exists."
Id.
31. Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 936 (Kan. 2000) (discussing duty to
warn of foreseeable dangers in the use of a product); see alsoJames B. Sales, The
Duty to Warn or Instruct in Strict Tort Liability, 13 ST. MARY'S L. J. 521, 554
(1982)(stating that "[d]irections for use serve purposes distinct from warnings.
Directions basically instruct the user of the product in the proper and efficient use
of the product and the proper manner to avoid unsafe uses.... [I]nstructions
seek to insure safe and appropriate use").
32. Maneely v. Gen. Motors Corp., 108 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir.
1997) (California law).
2000]
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1 • / ,,33
by "any obscure tidbit of available knowledge, and, therefore,
"[a] supplier of goods...is not required to provide a warning of
danger when the reasonable probability of injury is remote, slight,
• . . ,,14
or inconsequential.
Moreover, there is no rationale basis to impose a duty to warn
where no one has offered competent proof that the warning would
have been effective to make the product safer. That is:
a person cannot, after suffering an accident, simply draw
up a warning limited to the dangers involved in that acci-
dent and argue that that warning should have been con-
veyed by the manufacturer or seller without first also es-
tablishing that that warning is adequate and that it
actually could have been communicated in the manner
proposed.
5
Similarly, it is not enough for an expert to testify that some
additional warning or some modification of language was necessary
to raise a duty to warn. "[A] plaintiff must do more than simply
present an expert who espouses a new or different warning."36 The
expert must establish, based on reliable science that rests on a
proper foundation, his proposed warning's "feasibility, adequacy
and effectiveness. 37
1. Manufacturer's Knowledge Of Foreseeable Dangers
It is presumed that a manufacturer is in the best position to
know of foreseeable dangers of harm involved in the use of its
product. Furthermore, "a manufacturer must inform itself about
what designs and methods are available in its industry and is under
33. Ferayorni v. Hyundai Motor Co., 711 So. 2d 1167, 1172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
34. Henkel v. R&S Bottling Co., 323 N.W.2d 185, 188 (Iowa 1982); see also
Adelman-Tremblay v. Jewel Cos., Inc., 859 F.2d 517, 523 (7th Cir. 1988) (warning
unnecessary where plaintiffs harm was "not reasonably foreseeable" or where the
risk is "remotely possible" to few in the population); Brown v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
355 F.2d 814, 818 (4th Cir. 1966) (stating that "a manufacturer is not obligated
to. . .warn as to all possible dangers"); Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentan-
gling the "Right to Know" From the "Need to Know" About Consumer Product Hazards", 11
YALEJ. ON REG. 293, 346 (1994) (stating that manufacturers "do not have a duty to
warn of risks that may affect only very few individuals").
35. Meyerhoffv. Michelin Tire Corp., 852 F. Supp. 933, 947 (D. Kan. 1994),
affd, 70 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 1995).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 94748.
38. Richmond, supra note 1, at 206.
[Vol. 27:1
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a duty to make reasonable tests and inspections to discover any la-
tent hazards" associated with product use. Indeed, manufacturers
are held to the degree of knowledge and skill of experts. 4 Never-
theless, the guiding touchstone remains one of reasonableness re-
41
garding foreseeability, not omniscience..F
There are two questions in the foreseeability inquiry.42 First,
was the manner that the product was used reasonably foreseeable
by the manufacturer?43 Second, was the resulting injury itself rea-
sonably foreseeable? 44 Foreseeability includes not only uses in-
tended by the manufacturer, but also reasonably foreseeable mis-
uses.45 Further, a manufacturer must anticipate the environment
which is normal for its product's use. For example, the manufac-
turer of a household product must anticipate those conditions rea-
sonably foreseeable in the home environment in fashioning its
46warnings. In sum, foreseeability asks whether the particular use of
the product and the resulting injury were reasonably foreseeable by
the manufacturer. If the answer to this question is yes, the duty has
been established. If no, then the plaintiffs cause of action must
fail.
The burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the manufacturer
knew or should have known that it was reasonably foreseeable that
the plaintiff could use the product in a given way, and the dangers
of harm from that use were themselves reasonably foreseeable.47
While a given use might be reasonably foreseeable, the harm result-
ing from it might not. Alternatively, a given injury might be fore-
seeable, but not the use the product was put to that caused it. Both
elements must be satisfied before the duty to warn arises.
2. Known And Obvious Dangers
Even if a plaintiff is successful in establishing the foreseeability
39. Morgan v. Cavalier Acquisition Corp., 432 S.E.2d 915, 920 (N.C. Ct. App.
1993).
40. Collins v. Interroyal Corp., 466 N.E.2d 1191, 1200 (Il. App. Ct. 1984).
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY§ 2 (c) cmt. a (1998).
42. Richmond, supra note 1, at 206.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Sales, supra note 31, at 537.
46. Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 83-84 (4th Cir. 1962) (Virginia
law).
47. E.g., Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603, 609 (Fla. 1958) (placing the
burden on the plaintiff); Bouchard v. Am. Orthodontics, 661 A.2d 1143, 1145
(Me. 1995).
2000]
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element, the duty to warn will still not arise if the danger or poten-
tiality of danger accompanying the use of the product is generally
known and recognized. 8 As is noted by the Model Uniform Prod-
uct Liability Act, "a manufacturer should be able to assume that the
product user is familiar with obvious hazards-that knives cut, that
alcohol burns, that it is dangerous to drive automobiles at high
speed. '" 49 Accordingly, the "obvious danger rule" will bar recovery
where it can be shown that the danger was clearly apparent and
that a reasonable consumer would have appreciated the danger
50and acted accordingly without the need of a warning.
Although the obvious danger rule has been significantly abro-
gated in design defect cases, it remains a potent defense in failure-
to-warn claims. I The position of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability regarding obvious and generally-known dangers in
failure-to-warn cases is reflected in commentj to Section 2:
j. Warnings: obvious and generally known risks. In general, a
product seller is not subject to liability for failing to warn
or instruct regarding risks and risk-avoidance measures
that should be obvious to, or generally known by, foresee-
able product users. When a risk is obvious or generally
known, the prospective addressee of a warning will or
should already know of its existence. Warnings of an ob-
vious or generally known risk in most instances will not
provide an effective additional measure of safety.
An extension of the obvious danger rule is that manufacturers
generally have no duty to warn of dangers actually known to the
product user. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts' deci-
sion in Carey v. Lynn Ladder and Scaffolding Company, Inc.52 is instruc-
tive. The plaintiff sustained injuries when he fell from the seventh
step of an eight foot ladder, and sued the manufacturer for failure-
48. Maneely v. Gen. Motors Corp., 108 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing
California cases).
49. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 at 62,725 (1979).
50. Carey v. Lynn Ladder and Scaffolding Co., Inc., 691 N.E.2d 223, 224
(Mass. 1998).
51. E.g., Ogletree v. Navistar Int'l. Transp. Co., 500 S.E.2d 570, 572 (Ga.
1998) (stating that the "obvious danger rule" remains a potential defense in such
cases); Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 934-35 (Kan. 2000) (same); RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODuCrs LIABILITY § 2(c) cmt. d. (1998)(stating
that "[t] he fact that a danger is open and obvious is relevant to the issue of defec-
tiveness, but does not necessarily preclude a plaintiff from establishing that a rea-
sonable alternative design should have been adopted that would have reduced or
prevented injury to the plaintiff').
52. 691 N.E.2d 223 (Mass. 1998).
[Vol. 27:1
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to-warn. 53 The plaintiff testified that "every time he used the lad-
der, it was shaky" and that "he didn't need anyone to warn him not
to go up to the sixth step [of the ladder] . The trial court granted
summary judgment to the manufacturer, and the Supreme Judicial
Court affirmed. In so doing, the court explicitly noted that the
"plaintiff was aware of, and appreciated, the danger he was incur-
ring.. .so that a warning to the plaintiff was not needed."56 Thus, in
cases where the danger is generally known to the reasonable per-
son, or the specific plaintiff actually knew of the danger, summary
disposition of plaintiffs failure-to-warn claim is warranted.5 7
3. Through The Prism Of Risk-Benefit: No Legal Duty To Warn
Where The True Cost Of Warning Is Higher Than Its Benefit
The rationale for not requiring manufacturers to warn of
known or obvious dangers is supported by the risk-benefit analysis.
In failure-to-warn claims, the risk-benefit calculus deduces that
where the benefits of providing a warning are outweighed by the
58costs of providing it, a warning should not be given or required.
Where a danger is widely or actually known, the costs of warning of
the danger are needlessly increased: the recipient of the warning is
being told nothing new and will not alter his behavioral patterns in
59any appreciable way. Indeed, Comment j to Section 2 of the Re-
statement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability incorporates risk-benefit
analysis, cautioning that "warnings that deal with obvious or gener-
ally known risks may be ignored by users and consumers and may
diminish the significance of warnings about non-obvious, not gen-
erally known risks" and that "requiring warnings of obvious or gen-
erally known risks could reduce the efficacy of warnings gener-
ally."6"
As previously suggested, however, plaintiffs experts and unfor-
53. Id.
54. Id. at 224.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. E.g., Plante v. Hobart Corp., 771 F.2d 617, 621 (1st Cir. 1985) (reversing
verdict for plaintiff on warnings claim where "we do not see how one could rea-
sonably conclude that any such additional warnings would have made a differ-
ence; ... [the user] understood the relevant dangers").
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODucrs LIABILITY § (2) (c) cmt. j
(1998).
59. Id.
60. Id.
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tunately, juries, are often trapped in a "dollars and cents" analysis
of warning costs, which tends to underestimate the true costs asso-
ciated with providing additional warnings.f' They assume that the
costs of warning are simply those monetary costs required to print a
label and apply it to the product or include an additional page in
an owner's manual. This misconception places manufacturers
and sellers at a serious disadvantage because if additional warnings
are perceived as being almost cost-free, the burden will always be to
provide the additional warning.
However, the cost component is more akin to the economics
concept of opportunity cost, such that the decision to provide a
given warning is not merely an isolated choice to spend a few more
cents on "paper and ink." Rather, this component is interrelated
within an overall product warning configuration: the manufac-
turer's decision to warn about one risk can only be made with ref-
erence to the decision to warn about other risks related to product
use. Theodore Jankowski has explained:
[W] here.. .additional warnings [are] proposed, the effect
on the overall safety of the product, as determined by
their net effect on the communication of the risks associ-
ated with the universe of adverse outcomes, must be
evaluated. Whether the additional warnings take some at-
tention away from the warnings already given, establish
the misconception that all risks are the same, or lack con-
tent which would allow the user to avoid the risk, are all is-
sues that must be considered as part of the cost inherent
in providing additional warnings. From the standpoint of
overall safety, providing an additional warning does not by
itself serve the end of risk minimization if its effect is to
denigrate the standing of other warnings which are more
important in the safe utilization of the product. The cost
of additional warnings results from the decreased ability
of other warnings to communicate with the same effec-
tiveness. 6
Professors Henderson and Twerski also discuss the "crowding-
out" effect that can occur when a product user is inundated with
61. Supra note 8 and accompanying cases.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Theodore S. Jankowski, Focusing on Quality and Risk: The Central Role of
Reasonable Alternatives in Evaluating Design and Warnings Decisions, 36 S. TEX. L. REV.
283, 298 (1995).
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warnings of remote or obvious risks:
[W] arning about relatively remote risks generates substan-
tial social costs which in most cases outweigh any corre-
sponding benefits in reducing accident costs. The most
significant social cost generated by requiring distributors
to warn against remote risks is the reduced effectiveness of
potentially helpful warnings directed towards risks which
are not remote. Bombarded with nearly useless warnings
about risks that rarely materialize in harm, many consum-
ers could be expected to give up on warnings altogether.
And the few persons who might continue to take warnings
seriously in an environment crowded with warnings of
remote risks would probably overreact, investing too heav-
ily in their versions of "safety." Given these limits on the
capacity of consumers to react effectively to excessive risk
information, the optimal, rather than the highest, levels of
risk information, measured both qualitatively and quanti-
tatively, are what is called for.65
Arguably, the risk-benefit conclusions reached by a manufac-
turer about whether or not to warn are, once again, subject to a
reasonableness standard: would a reasonable manufacturer refrain
from warning about a given risk as being so attenuated or obvious
as to detract from warnings about more salient and less apparent
risks? It would seem, therefore, that at least in some cases, deciding
not to warn is a reasonable course for a manufacturer to follow.
This is particularly true where the alleged "danger" is either very
remote or at least reasonably apparent. In such cases, manufactur-
ers can argue that as a matter of law, they should not be held ac-
countable for not providing a warning that might diminish a user's
capacity to heed other warnings of more common or less-known
risks.
As Henderson and Twerski point out, however, it is difficult if
not impossible to accurately plot the limits of human cognitive ca-
pability. 7 It cannot be said with precision when the information
overload point is reached. As such, defendants generally have a
hard time convincing a judge or jury that providing "one more
warning" would tip the balance from the optimal amount of prod-
uct warning to too much. 6' Nevertheless, even in cases where
65. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 5, at 296-97.
66. Jankowski, supra note 64, at 289.
67. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 5, at 301.
68. Id.
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judgment as a matter of law is not appropriate, defendants can and
should present evidence that the provision of additional warnings
does not come without significant costs, and those costs should not
be measured solely in monetary terms. This may prove to be the
difference in prevailing against marginal failure-to-warn claims.
4. Modification Of The Product
While a manufacturer must warn of reasonably foreseeable
dangers associated with the use of the product as they designed it,
products are frequently modified by the end user. Generally, a
manufacturer need not warn of the dangers inherent in a product
that has been modified without manufacturer's consultation or ap-
proval. 69 The modification may be held to both create an essen-
tially new product (where the duty to warn devolves to the person
who modified the product) and to constitute an unforeseeable in-
tervening cause.70
However, a duty to warn may arise if the manufacturer can rea-
sonably anticipate that a product will change and become danger-
ous absent a warning through regular use or deterioration."' In ei-
ther case, the test once again is whether the condition of the
product, when it causes injury, was reasonably foreseeable by the
manufacturer.
2
B. Breaching The Duty To Warn
Assuming a plaintiff successfully establishes that a defendant
manufacturer had a duty to warn, the plaintiff must then show that
the manufacturer breached that duty. A manufacturer can breach
its duty to warn in two ways: (1) by failing "to take adequate meas-
ures to communicate the warning to the ultimate user," or (2) by
failing "to provide a warning that, if communicated, was adequate
to apprise the user of the product's potential risks.,73 Stated other-
wise, a manufacturer breaches its duty to warn if it fails to provide
any warning at all or provides a warning that fails to sufficiently im-
part the risks of harm in a meaningful way. Because it is obvious
69. Sales, supra note 31, at 582-83.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Henry v. Gen. Motors Corp., 60 F.3d 1545, 1548 (11th Cir. 1995) (Georgia
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that the duty is breached when a manufacturer owes a duty to warn
and provides none, the difficult question focuses on whether a
given warning was adequate to inform the user of risks of harm.'
4
Thus, conflict over whether a manufacturer breached its duty to
warn necessarily requires examination of a given warning's effec-
tiveness.
1. Adequacy Of The Manufacturer's Warning: Judicial
Constructions
The courts have announced a number of broad principles to
consider when determining whether a given warning is adequate.
Generally, a warning must be of a character reasonably calculated
to bring home to the reasonably prudent person the nature and ex-
tent of the danger involved.75 To do so, a warning must: (1) catch
the attention of the reasonably prudent product user during use;
and (2) be comprehensible to the average user and convey a fair
indication of the nature and extent of the danger. 76 A warning
must possess a degree of intensity that would cause a reasonable
person to exercise caution commensurate with the potential dan-77
ger. A warning may be found inadequate in factual content, in
expression of the facts, or in the method by which it is conveyed.
7
8
A clear cautionary statement setting forth the exact nature of the
dangers is necessary to fully protect the manufacturer. 79 Ordinarily,
the question of whether a given warning was adequate is left to the
finder of fact.
80
James Sales has identified seven factors, which govern the ade-
quacy of a warning."1 First, a warning must be conspicuous. It must
be printed in such a manner as to assure that a user's attention will
82be attracted to its message. Second, it should use symbols when
appropriate. For example, a skull and crossbones device may be
necessary in addition to written warnings if the product can cause
74. Sales, supra note 31, at 550.
75. Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 85 (4th Cir. 1962).
76. Id.
77. Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603, 609 (Fla. 1958).
78. Spruill, 308 F.2d at 85.
79. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Black and Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 868, 873
(Tex. Ct. App. 1974).
80. Tampa Drug Co., 103 So. 2d at 609; see also Spruill, 308 F.2d at 86.
81. Sales, supra note 31, at 558-67.
82. Id. at 559.
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death8 3 Third, it must sufficiently communicate the risk of danger
associated with the product. In that regard, the warning must be
84
qualitatively sufficient to impart the particular risk of harm.
Fourth, the warning must be located where the user is likely to en-
counter it. In some cases, placement of the warning in an owner's
manual or package insert will be sufficient; in others, placement on
85
the product itself may be required . In the latter case, the warning
must be placed where it will catch the user's eye. Fifth, the warn-
ing must be clear and unambiguous. Its content must not be vague
or otherwise minimize the likelihood of the very harm it is seeking
to put the user on guard of.s 7 Sixth, the warning must be suffi-
ciently broad and encompassing and not unduly limited in scope.""
If the product can reasonably be put to a number of uses, the warn-
ing should address each. Seventh, the warning must be undiluted.
That is, the manufacturer cannot engage in marketing or promo-
tional activities, which tend to negate the very dangers the warning
speaks of. 9
One additional factor which may play a role in determining
adequacy of the warning is language. As a general matter, manu-
facturers are not required to warn in any language other than Eng-
lish. 90 However, the duty to warn in another language may arise in
cases where a manufacturer actively markets its product to a non-
English speaking segment of the population and utilizes non-
English language media in reaching its audience."
While these factors undoubtedly cover a broad spectrum, it is
possible that any one of them may become central in determining
whether a manufacturer discharged its duty to warn. A defendant
is advised to determine which factors are most relevant to the claim
it is defending.
83. Id. (citing Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402 (1st Cir.
1965)).
84. Sales, supra note 31, at 560.
85. Id. at 562-64.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 564.
88. Id. at 564-65.
89. Id. at 566.
90. E.g., R. Geoffrey Dillard, Multilingual Warning Labels: Product Liability, "Of-
ficial English, " and Consumer Safety, 29 GA. L. REv. 197, 208 (1994) (stating that only
the English language is required when warning); Thomas H. Lee, A Purposeful Ap-
proach to Products Liability Warnings and Non-English Speaking Consumers, 47 VAND. L.
REv. 1107, 1109 (1994) (same).
91. Dillard, supra note 90, at 208.
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Moreover, a defendant should not lose sight of the fact that
determination of a warning's adequacy is based on a balancing test.
That balancing has been succinctly described as follows:
[D] etermination of the content of a product warning is a
design decision involving tradeoffs between the costs and
benefits of selectivity .... [T]he designer of the product
warning should consider the probability that the risk will
be encountered, the severity of harm likely to result, the
general characteristics of the expected user including his
experience or knowledge, the likelihood that a warning
will be effective in reducing the risk and the expected con-
text in which the product will be used. 92
Accordingly, if a manufacturer can show that its decision about
how to warn, or not to provide a warning, was reasonable under the
circumstances, it should not be found liable under a failure-to-warn
theory.
2. Criticism Of TheJudicial Adequacy Yardstick
The court-created guidelines determining whether a warning
is adequate or not, while useful as guideposts, lack a scientific defi-
niteness. Accordingly, they have not gone without criticism. As
Victor Schwartz and Russell Driver have pointed out:
Although the evaluation of the efficacy of a product warn-
ing is a complex and difficult process, few courts provide
more than open-ended generalities to the jury in instruct-
ing in this area. The apparent absence of technical or sci-
entific guidelines regarding what an adequate warning is
allows sympathetic juries considerable leeway to compen-
sate an injured plaintiff from the manufacturer's deep
pocket.93
Schwartz and Driver further caution about the dangers of us-
ing "open-ended generalities" to determine the adequacy of warn-
ings:
[O]verly broad legal guidelines regarding the adequacy of
warnings, not supported by scientific principles, may
cause some manufacturers to substitute 'legally sufficient,'
but practicably useless and perhaps even counterproduc-
tive warnings, for more innovative and effective warnings.
92. Victor E. Schwartz & Russell W. Driver, Warnings in the Workplace: The Need
for a Synthesis of Law and Communication Theoy, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 38, 61 (1983).
93. Id. at 40.
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If the rules regarding warnings foster that kind of irra-
tionality and unpredictability, some manufacturers mayS 94
regard the whole exercise as futile.
As such, unless courts use scientific guidelines to determine
the necessity and/or adequacy of a warning, a manufacturer might
conclude that minimizing its liability through "encyclopedic" warn-
ings is preferable to providing an "optimal" disclosure of risk in-
formation. While an "optimal" disclosure might omit warning of a
remote danger in the interest of providing a better warning ad-
dressing more substantial risks, a manufacturer may be less inclined
to provide the optimal warning because doing so may expose it to
potential liability.95
C. Causation: Would A Warning Have Made A Difference?
If the plaintiff establishes that the manufacturer or seller owed
and breached a duty to warn, the issue of proximate causation
arises. Proximate causation includes both cause-in-fact (but-for)
and legal causation. 6 There are essentially two avenues for a plain-
tiff to establish causation depending upon the jurisdiction: the
plaintiff can offer non-speculative proof that she would have
heeded an adequate warning, and/or rely on an unrebutted heed-
ing presumption where no warning is given.9' In the latter case, the
defendant must initially demonstrate that the plaintiff would not
have followed an additional or better warning, in the former, the
plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she, or a reasonable per-
son, would follow the warnings in the same situation. In either
situation, however, the defendant's task is the same: it must intro-
duce a quantum of evidence necessary to show that plaintiff would
not have followed a warning if given.
1. The Plaintiff's Burden
In those situations where a heeding presumption does not ap-
ply, or has been successfully rebutted by the defendant, the burden
94. Id. at 43.
95. Jankowski, supra note 64, at 289; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § (2)(c) cmt. g (1998).
96. Hiner v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 978 P.2d 505, 509 (Wash. 1999).
97. Mark Geistfeld, Inadequate Product Warnings and Causation, 30 U. MICH. J.
L. REF. 309, 337-38 (1997).
98. Id. at 343-44.
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is on the plaintiff to show causation. 99 At bottom, this requires
plaintiff to prove that, had the manufacturer supplied an adequate
warning, the plaintiff would have altered her behavior to avoid in-
jury.'0 0 That is to say, but for the absence of the warning, the injury
would not have occurred.
Under an objective standard for causation, the plaintiff must
show that a reasonable person would have followed a warning if
given.01 Under a subjective standard, plaintiff must show that she102
would have altered her behavior if warned. Under either stan-
dard, plaintiff must offer competent evidence that affirmatively an-
swers the question "[w]hat difference would [a warning] have
made in this case?' '10 3 "The evidence must support a reasonable in-
ference, rather than a guess, that the existence of an adequate
warning may have prevented the accident before the issue of causa-
tion may be submitted to the jury. ' ,104  Mere speculation is not
99. Hiner, 978 P.2d at 509; see also Sharpe v. Bestop, Inc., 713 A.2d 1079, 1086
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
100. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 5, at 305 (stating that a plaintiff must
show "not only that [the reader] would have read, understood and remembered
the warning, but also that she would have altered her conduct to avoid the in-
jury."). In other words, a plaintiff is required to offer competent evidence that an-
swers the question, "[w] hat difference would [a warning] have made in this case?"
Id. at 304; see also Conti v. Ford Motor Co., 743 F.2d 195, 198 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1028 (1985) (stating that "[t]he evidence must be such as to sup-
port a reasonable inference, rather than a guess, that the existence of an adequate
warning may have prevented the accident before the issue of causation may be
submitted to the jury"); Nelson v. Ford Motor Co., 150 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir.
1998) (dismissing warnings claim where it was not shown that modified or addi-
tional warnings would have likely prevented the accident); Am. Motors Corp. v.
Ellis, 403 So. 2d 459, 466 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)(stating that "[o] nly if we were
to engage in the speculation that the owner, properly warned, would not have
purchased the car, or would not have allowed it to be driven on interstate high-
ways, could we recognize a causal relationship between breach of a duty to warn
and the instant injury."), rev. denied, 415 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 1982); Broussard v.
Houdaille Indus., Inc., 539 N.E.2d 360, 363 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (same); Mowery v.
Crittenton Hosp., 400 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (plaintiff must show
that an adequate warning would have prevented the injury by altering the defen-
dant's conduct involved); Mothershead v. Greenbriar Country Club, 994 S.W.2d
80, 89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that plaintiff must show that a warning would
alter behavior).
101. Geistfeld, supra note 97, at 337-38.
102. Id.
103. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 5, at 304.
104. Conti, 743 F.2d at 198; accord Drackett Prods. Co. v. Blue, 152 So. 2d 463,
465 (Fla. 1963) (stating that a "statement by a witness as to what action he would
have taken if something had occurred which did not occur ... prov[es] nothing").
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enough.° Further, "[t] he required causal connection.., is weak if
the proof shows that the claimant would have pursued the same
,,106course of conduct irrespective of any cautionary information.
A recent case thoroughly analyzing these concepts is Hiner v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.'07 There, plaintiff had a third party install
studded snow tires, which she obtained from her father, on the
front wheels of her front-wheel drive car.' ts The rear tires were not
changed."°9 Due to handling problems associated with this configu-
ration, plaintiff lost control of her car and collided with a truck."'
She sued the tire manufacturer and car manufacturer alleging fail-
ure-to-warn of the dangers of mounting studded snow tires only on
the front wheels."'
The Supreme Court of Washington upheld the grant of sum-
mary judgment for the tire manufacturer on the failure-to-warn
claim. " First, the court was impressed by the fact that a warning of
such problems was printed in the vehicle's owner's manual, which
the plaintiff admitted she did not read."3 Second, the court noted
that a warning on the tires would have been ineffective because
plaintiff admitted that she did not examine the tires for warnings.
1 4
Finally, the court rejected as mere speculation the argument that a
warning on the tires, if not noticed by plaintiff, might have been
noticed by the third-party installer of the tires.' '5
2. Failure To Heed A Given Warning
When a plaintiff is injured by a product containing a warning,
the question of whether the warning was adequate may not arise if
plaintiff failed to read the allegedly inadequate warning. Numer-
ous courts have held that any insufficiency of the warning may not
be the proximate cause of an injury when the user fails to read it."'
105. Hiner, 978 P.2d at 510.
106. M. Stuart Madden, The Duty to Warn in Products Liability: Contours and Criti-
cism, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 221, 272 (1987).
107. 978 P.2d 505 (Wash. 1999).
108. Id. at 508.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at505.
113. Hiner v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 978 P.2d 505, 507 (Wash. 1999).
114. Id. at 508.
115. Id.
116. E.g., Nelson v. Ford Motor Co., 150 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir. 1998); Henry
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 60 F.3d 1545, 1548 (11th Cir. 1995); Hurt v. Coyne Cylinder
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For example, in Henry v. General Motors Corp., the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, applying Georgia law, upheld a grant of summary
judgment to the manufacturer on a failure-to-warn claim where the
plaintiff admitted seeing the warning but not reading it."7 The
plaintiff argued that this rule should not apply because he was illit-
erate and could not read the warning. " s Nevertheless, the court
concluded that "[w] hy the user failed to read the warning.., does
not matter. Whatever the user's reason, if the user is aware of a
warning but ignores its language, the manufacturer's negligence in
drafting the warning ceases as a matter of law to be a cause of in-
jury. 119 120
However, there are contrary views regarding this issue. In
Town of Bridport v. Sterling Clark Lurton Corp.,12 1 a claim for failure-to-
warn of the dangers of fire presented by floor cleaning materials,
which spontaneously combusted causing serious property damage,
was not barred simply because the plaintiff admitted he did not
read the warnings on the product containers.122 Rather, because
the plaintiff "squarely raised the conspicuousness of the warnings as
an issue," the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that "[a] Ithough [the
user] did not look at the warnings, plaintiff could still show that in-
adequate warnings were a proximate cause of the fire by establish-
ing that the warnings were not properly designed to draw the atten-
tion of a reasonably prudent person. ,12
Accordingly, under both Henry and Town of Bridport, a plain-
tiffs claim for failure-to-warn will fail when the user sees the warn-
Co., 956 F.2d 1319, 1329 (6th Cir. 1992); Eyre v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc.,
755 F.2d 416, 417 (5th Cir. 1985))(Georgia law);Johnson v. Niagara Mach. & Tool
Works, 666 F.2d 1223, 1225 (8th Cir 1981); E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Cox, 477
So. 2d 963, 968 (Ala. 1985); Ashby Div. of Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Dobkin, 458
So. 2d 335, 337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Cobb Heating & Air Conditioning Co.,
Inc. v. Hertron Chem. Co., 229 S.E.2d 681, 682-83 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976); Kane v.
R.D. Werner Co., Inc., 657 N.E.2d 37, 39 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995), appeal denied, 664
N.E.2d 641, 641 (Ill. 1996); Felice v. ValleyLab, Inc., 520 So. 2d 920, 928 (La. Ct.
App. 1987), writ denied, 522 So. 2d 564, 564 (La. 1988); Hiner v. Bridge-
stone/Firestone, Inc., 978 P.2d 505, 510 (Wash. 1999).
117. 60 F.3d at 1548.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. E.g., Town of Bridport v. Sterling Clark Lurton Corp., 693 A.2d 701, 701
(Vt. 1997); Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1962).
121. 693 A.2d 701 (Vt. 1997).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 704-05. The court ultimately ruled that the plaintiff failed to make
"the requisite showing that the warnings were insufficiently prominent." Id. at 705.
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ing for what it is but fails to follow it. However, failure to read the
warning because the warning was not noticed in the first instance
can raise the issue of the warning's adequacy, a question of fact,
which may preclude judgment as a matter of law. 24 The plaintiff
bears the burden of proof that the warning was insufficiently
prominent.
12 5
3. The Heeding Presumption
Many jurisdictions recognize a heeding presumption on the
basis of comment j to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.126  The relevant provision states: "[w]here [a] warning is
given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and
heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which is safe for
use if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unrea-
sonably dangerous. As written, the benefits of the presumption
afforded by comment j run to the manufacturer. However, when
commentj was applied in situations where no warning was provided,
courts created a corollary to the presumption that shifted the bene-
fit of the presumption to the plaintiff: if an adequate warning had
been given, it is presumed that the plaintiff would have followed
it.12 8 The admitted purpose of this corollary presumption-in cases
where no warning is present-is to lighten a plaintiffs burden of
proof in order to assist the plaintiff in surmounting the causation
hurdle.
129
The heeding presumption has not gone without criticism,
however, both as to the benefits it affords manufacturers as well as
plaintiffs. Professor Latin argues that the commentj presumption, as
it applies to manufacturers, provides a disincentive to the develop-
ment of safer products. 30 Because a product is rendered safe and
not unreasonably dangerous when it carries an appropriate warn-
ing under strict liability theory, and the provision of reasonable
warnings will likewise serve to defeat negligent failure-to-warn
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS§ 402A cmt.j (1998).
127. Id.; see also Richard C. Henke, The Heeding Presumption in Failure-to-Warn
Cases: Opening Pandora's Box?, 30 SETON HALL L. REv. 174, 182 (1999).
128. Henke, supra note 127, at 182.
129. Sharpe v. Bestop, Inc., 713 A.2d 1079, 1083-84 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998).
130. Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1193, 1257 (1994).
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claims, manufacturers have no incentive to make products safer
when a warning alone will suffice to shield them from liability. 3'
Moreover, the presumption is contrary to the recent emphasis
placed by courts on ensuring that evidence (particularly expert
opinion testimony) is sufficiently reliable and scientific before it
can be admitted. Recent scientific research "clearly establishes
that one cannot rely on even the most carefully-designed label to
consistently and reliably elicit compliance with its admonitions.,
13
1
In the face of this research, as well as ordinary experience demon-
strating that warning labels often go unheeded, "a presumption
that a specific product user would have behaved differently if only a
warning label (or a different warning label) had been present is
fundamentally at odds with the courts' efforts to insure that deci-
sion-making in products liability cases is based on reliable evidence
rather than junk-science.",
13 4
In addition, the benefits afforded plaintiffs by the heeding
presumption have also been disapproved. In Riley v. American
'35Honda Motor Co., Inc., the Montana Supreme Court declined to
adopt a rebuttable heeding presumption, concluding that "the pre-
sumption is not appropriate running in either direction, to the
manufacturer/seller where a warning is given or to a plaintiff
where it is not., 13 6 The court reasoned that relieving a plaintiff of
establishing causation could not be justified, in that "[a] defendant
certainly is in no better position to rebut a presumption which to-
tally excuses a plaintiff from meeting the causation element than a
plaintiff is in establishing the causation element...., 3 7
The criticisms leveled at the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section
402A commentj presumption, and its corollary presumption, are re-
flected in the Restatement (Third). 31 Comment I to Section 2 of the
Restatement (Third) provides in pertinent part that "when a safer de-
sign can reasonably be implemented and risks can reasonably be
designed out of a product, adoption of the safer design is required
131. Id.
132. E.g, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579 (1993); Gen-
eral Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147-48 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmi-
chael, 526 U.S. 137, 138-139 (1999).
133. Bowbeer & Killoran, supra note 30, at 757-58 & nn. 149-50.
134. Id. at 758-59.
135. 856 P.2d 196 (Mont. 1993).
136. Id. at 200.
137. Id.
138. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY§ 402A cmt.j (1998).
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over a warning that leaves a significant residuum of such risks."'3 9
This view clearly incorporates Professor Latin's arguments. 40 The
Restatement (Third) is also conspicuously silent regarding the corol-
lary presumption as it applies to plaintiffs where no warning was
provided. 141 In short, the Restatement (Third) has rejected the use of
these presumptions.1
4
2
Nevertheless, in jurisdictions where the corollary heeding pre-
sumption is applicable, the plaintiff need only prove initially that
the manufacturer owed a duty to warn and failed to adequately do
so: it is then presumed the user would have followed an adequate
warning. The burden of production then shifts to the defendant to
rebut the presumption. The New Jersey Superior Court Appellate
Division has explained this shifting:
[O]nce the heeding presumption comes into play, the
burden of coming forward with evidence, i.e., the burden
of production, shifts to the defendant to overcome or re-
but the presumption... [T]he defendant's failure to pro-
duce evidence at this stage 'risk[s] a directed finding
against it' on the issue of proximate causation. If, how-
ever, the defendant satisfies its burden of production, that
is, if defendant presents sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption.. .the presumption disappears and the plain-
tiff, consistent with his original burden of persuasion,
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
failure to warn was a proximate cause of his injury... I]f
defendant fails to produce evidence to rebut the pre-
sumption, plaintiff is relieved of proving proximate causa-
tion.
4 3
In order to defeat the presumption, the defendant must pre-
sent evidence such that reasonable minds could differ as to
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFToRTs: PRODUcTS LIABILITY§ 2 cmt. 1 (1998).
140. Latin, supra note 130, at 1257. Even the new position staked out by the
Restatement (Third) is not without detractors insofar as it might impose liability on
manufacturers who nevertheless provide adequate warnings. Id. See also Victor E.
Schwartz, See No Evil, Hear No Evil: When Clear and Adequate Warnings Do Not Prevent
The Imposition of Product Liability, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 47, 52 (1999); W. Kennedy
Simpson et al., Recent Developments in Products, General Liability, and Consumer Law,
35 TORT& INS. L.J. 553, 568-71 (2000).
140. Henke, supra note 127, at 182-83.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Sharpe v. Bestop, Inc., 713 A.2d 1079, 1085 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998).
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whether the warning, if given, would have been heeded.144 This can
be done in several ways: first, by offering evidence concerning the
plaintiffs knowledge of the very risk that the absent warning was
supposed to address; second, by introducing evidence of the plain-
tiffs conduct and the circumstances surrounding his use of the
product that would call into question whether the plaintiff would
have noticed a warning if provided, and would have been motivated
to heed the warning if he had noticed it; and third, by introducing
evidence of plaintiffs attitudes and conduct that demonstrates an
indifference to safety warnings generally. 45
4. Disputing Plaintiff's Evidence That She Would Have Followed A
Warning
Once a plaintiff presents evidence tending to show that she
would have followed a warning if given the opportunity to do so, or
the heeding presumption is invoked, the manufacturer must intro-
duce evidence to the contrary in order to defeat causation. "The
appropriate quantum of evidence needed...is that which will dem-
onstrate that a given plaintiff has a 'habit' of ignoring safety warn-
ings.', 46 "[T]he defendant must adduce evidence, either from the
plaintiff or other witnesses, that the plaintiff has in the past failed
to heed safety warnings... and that the plaintiffs indifference to the
warning[s] rose to the level of habit."
4
148
In Sharpe v. Bestop, Inc., the plaintiff was ejected from hisjeep
when he fell asleep behind the wheel and impacted a guardrail.' 
9
The jeep was equipped with a soft top and the doors had been re-
moved. 10 Although the vehicle's sun visor was labeled with a warn-
ing stating "WEAR SEAT BELTS AT ALL TIMES," the plaintiff did
not wear his seatbelt at the time of the accident.151 Nevertheless,
the plaintiff alleged that the manufacturers of the jeep and the soft
top failed to warn him of the dangers of driving the vehicle so• • •152
equipped without wearing a seatbelt. The court affirmed a jury
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1089.
146. Id. at 1091 (citing Magro v. Ragsdale Bros., Inc., 721 S.W.2d 832 (Tex.
1986)); see also Technical Chem. Co. v.Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 602-03 (Tex. 1972).
147. Sharpe, 713 A.2d at 1091.
148. Id. at 1079.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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finding of no proximate causation.5 The court concluded that the
failure to heed the unambiguous warning on the sun visor pre-
cluded plaintiff from arguing that he would have heeded an addi-
tional warning, in light of plaintiffs own testimony that he knew of
the existing warning but rarely wore his seatbelt.-
4
In many cases where no warning accompanies the product, the
manufacturer can still argue and prove that a warning would not
have changed the result. For example, a defendant can demon-
strate that the user failed to follow other safety warnings so there is
no basis to believe that the absence of the proposed warning would
have altered the user's behavior. A simple method of doing so
would be, for example, to introduce evidence that the plaintiff was
a cigarette smoker, in spite of the presence of on-package warnings,
or had numerous speeding tickets, or the like. Whatever the proof,
such evidence can go a long way in establishing that the absence of
a warning was not the proximate cause of injury.
5. Intervening Or Superseding Causes
A manufacturer may attempt to defeat plaintiffs proof of cau-
sation by showing that the act of a third party operated as the effi-
cient intervening or superseding cause of the injury. 155 "An inter-
vening or superseding cause is an event that produces harm
different from that foreseen by the manufacturer, or a type of harm
brought about by an independent force after the defendant's tor-
tious conduct has occurred." 6 The intervening event severs the
causal connection between the manufacturer's conduct and the
plaintiffs harm. "A superseding cause is a factor of such extraordi-
nary, unforeseeable nature as to relieve the original wrongdoer of
liability to the ultimate victim.'
' 57
In Briscoe v. Amazing Products, Inc., the plaintiff suffered severe
injuries when a drain cleaner called "Liquid Fire," a highly caustic
substance, was thrown on him in the course of a criminal attack.
58
He alleged that the manufacturer and distributor failed to warn of
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Madden, supra note 106, at 273.
156. Richmond, supra note 1, at 214.
157. Briscoe v. Amazing Prods., Inc., No. 1998-CA-001289-MR, 2000 WL
377494, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2000).
158. Id.
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the dangers of Liquid Fire. 59 The Kentucky Court of Appeals af-
firmed summary disposition of the claims because the attacker ad-
mitted knowing of the product's dangerous propensities, and pur-
posefully used the product as a weapon. According to the court,
"there is simply no manufacturer's warning which could prevent
this type of intentional conduct. "'161 The criminal attack severed the
causal link between any alleged tortious conduct of the defendant's
and plaintiffs injury.
162
IV. CONCLUSION
The nature of the failure-to-warn claim, whether brought
solely or in connection with other claims, requires defendants to
analyze a plaintiffs case with care. While the debate continues over
whether such claims are more appropriately brought in strict liabil-
ity or negligence, the Restatement (Third) and recent cases indicate
that any distinction between the two theories is more imagined
than real. Under either theory, the plaintiff must establish a duty
to warn based on reasonably foreseeable dangers. Reasonableness
is the key, not speculation to the limits of all probability. The duty
can be attacked where the use of the product or resulting injury
was not reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer, the danger
was of generally known and obvious nature, where additional warn-
ings would have the propensity to dilute others of more impor-
tance, or where the plaintiff modified the product in a way the
manufacturer could not have anticipated.
Whether a manufacturer breached a duty owed generally de-
pends upon analysis of the warning itself. Defense counsel must be
prepared to dispute court-created standards of a warning's ade-
quacy when scientific principles dictate a contrary result. Finally, a
plaintiff cannot prevail unless causation is established. Although
many jurisdictions will presume a warning would have been heeded
if given, defense counsel must strive to prove the opposite in the
face of plaintiffs proof that she would. When a plaintiff notices yet
fails to read a given warning, or where a superseding cause inter-
venes in the causal chain of events, any tortious conduct of the
manufacturer ceases to be the basis of plaintiffs injuries.
159. Id. at*1.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at *2.
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Despite some of the advantages plaintiffs may have in prose-
cuting the failure-to-warn cause of action, defense counsel who pay
attention to the key elements of the claim and offer contrary proof
at every stage of plaintiffs case stand a good chance of a successful
outcome for their client.
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